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Abstract
Transition economies have an initial condition of high human capital relative to
living standards.  I explore the possible implications of this key fact by surveying and
adapting literature on growth and inequality. I focus especially on the long run and policy
options.
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*This paper grew out of lectures I delivered at the  ZEI-CEPR Conference “Labour Markets, Work and
Welfare During The Transition and Integration Process”, Riga, Latvia, March 2001.  I am grateful to
Michael Kaganovich for many useful discussions on the subject of this paper.1
1.  INTRODUCTION
Economies undergoing transition from central command to markets represent
major challenges to economic theory.  One such challenge is to the conventional wisdom
of economic growth of recent decades: the role in productivity growth that economic
theory as well as empirical literature attributes to the stock of an economy’s human
capital.  The model of economic growth presented in Lucas (1988) “On the Mechanics of
Economic Development”, where education is introduced as a major factor of sustainable
growth, has become a standard approach to modeling growth.  The puzzling feature of
most transition economies, according to the premise of the “new growth theory”, is that
educational achievements in them are completely out of proportion to their per capita
GDPs.  Namely, standard measures of educational attainment are as high or even higher
than in the world’s richest countries yet the typical transition economy has a per capita
GDP similar to that of a middle income developing country.  Therefore, from the growth
theory perspective, the economies in this group are in acute imbalance with regard to
utilization of their human capital resources; hence one should expect the transition
process to rectify this.
The empirical growth literature [e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Krueger
and Lindahl (2001)] suggests that education is indeed an important factor of economic
growth.  On this basis one might expect that transition economies should be rapidly
improving their performance, particularly in modern hi-tech sectors of the economy, and
thus their productivity levels should be on their way to catching up with the trend
corresponding to their human capital levels.  The evidence so far suggests, however, that
this vision is not supported by the experience of many transition economies, and certainly2
of most of the former Soviet successor states.  Below I will present models that can
display the reverse pattern: rather than an economy’s productivity and living standards
growing to match the high levels of its human capital indicators, it is the human capital
that may deteriorate, in a lifetime of one generation, to match the third world levels of
their living standards.  Thus I argue that transition economies posses not only a potential
for rapid growth but also a possibility for further deterioration, both in terms of
productivity and human capital. I then consider some public policy options that could
sustain high levels of educational attainment and facilitate productive utilization of
human capital in transition economies.
There is a substantial body of recent literature documenting the superior
educational attainment in most transition economies, as well as the current state of their
educational sectors.  Gros and Suhrcke (2000) systematically study education levels in
transition countries using cross-section regressions on 148 countries and find that
transition countries have much higher secondary and tertiary enrollment rates than their
per capita GDP would predict.  This general idea of a positive educational legacy of
communism is confirmed in other studies including Micklewright (1999), UNICEF
(2000) and UNICEF (2001) that also show that, after some initial dips, tertiary
enrollments have tended to rise above pre-transition levels.  These works do not,
however, paint a universally rosy picture, emphasizing substantial disparities in access to
education, based on family background, urban/rural location, ethnicity and financial
resources.  They also document substantial deterioration in educational provision
quantified by decreased public expenditure and declining secondary school and pre-
school enrollments.  These problems are especially sharp in the Caucasus and Central3
Asia but they affect all but perhaps the most successful Central European transition
economies.
It is possible that declining enrollments are due to a failure of education to yield
economic returns.  In fact, Micklewright (1999), UNICEF (2000) and UNICEF (2001) all
document particularly sharp drops in enrollment in vocational secondary schools which,
in many cases, have surely been rendered obsolete in the new economic environment.
However, Münich, Svejnar, and Terrell (1999) show that the transition from communism
has brought a significant increase in the returns to human capital in the Czech Republic.
It also summarizes most of the earlier empirical work for a variety of transition countries
that tends to draw similar conclusions.  Therefore, there must be some other factors
driving declining enrollments, with family-level financial constraints being a likely
candidate.
The literature offering a theoretical analysis of dynamics of human capital in
transition economies and putting it into the mainstream growth theory perspective,
however, has been so far quite limited.  Spagat (1995) and Overland and Spagat (1996)
study human capital investment in the transition economy environment as a matter of a
government’s optimal investment policy.  These works stress the notion that, while
human capital can only be built up slowly over the long term, it can deteriorate rapidly if
basic maintenance investment is neglected.  Thus, if government is short sighted and
human capital investment is temporarily postponed, its decline can quickly take on an
irreversible character.
Alexeev and Kaganovich (1998) (AK) analyze career dynamics of highly
educated professionals at the initial stages of transition.  Their model provides an4
explanation of the following phenomenon that characterized Russia’s initial transition
experience: it has been observed that the first crop of “nouveau riche” came out of the
ranks of educated professionals who were less successful in their pre-transition careers
and chose to abandon them at the first sign of looming reforms.  According to AK’s
model, the most intellectually able individuals, the “good guys”, had stronger incentives
to exert high educational effort and hence had more successful professional careers (such
as industrial engineering and science) prior to the start of reforms.  They demonstrate that
uncertainty over whether or not a major reform will be implemented can lead the “good
guys”, i.e., the more able people, to prepare relatively little for the possible change
compared to less able people.  This is because the good guys had higher opportunity cost
of placing bets on reforms taking place.  If reform is actually implemented, the good guys
“finish last”, compared to their formerly less successful counterparts, due to their failure
to make an early market oriented career switch.  One notable implication of this
phenomenon, according to AK’s model, is that resource and income distribution at the
early stage of transition exhibits a significant mismatch with the distribution of human
capital, at least, as far as the first generation of transition contemporaries is concerned.
Fan, Overland and Spagat (1999) (FOS) has a strong connection with AK’s
conclusion.  They argue that educational restructuring should have high priority early in
Russia’s transition process, emphasizing the potential for loss of human capital without
such a policy.  Like AK, FOS focus on individual-level human capital investment
decisions, but they take the analysis one generation further.  They stress the dependence
of children’s human capital acquisition decisions on the human capital of their parents
(this empirically based fact is a standard premise of most models of education in the “new5
growth theory” literature).  This fact, combined with the phenomenon, analyzed in AK,
that many highly educated parents of the first transition generation fall behind in terms of
incomes, leads FOS to demonstrate a potential failure of a transition economy to ensure
intergenerational transmission of it initially high level of human capital.  FOS also show
how delaying educational reform can exacerbate economic inequality.
Spagat (2002) also models transition economies as having an initial condition of
high human capital relative to GDP per capita, developing a framework in which this
starting point can translate into two qualitatively distinct equilibria for the economy.  At a
good equilibrium a large number of children of well-educated parents take advantage of
their family backgrounds and invest substantially in their own human capital.  At a bad
equilibrium, past educational achievements are wasted as children fail to build upon their
parents’ achievements (this analysis builds on the “poverty trap” models of development
literature and adapts them to the transition policy dilemmas).  I argued that this sort of
multiple equilibria situation provides a basis for distinguishing development economics
from transition economics.  In particular, without a starting point based on high human
capital an economy can only develop slowly and painfully.  On the other hand, the high
human capital starting point of transition economies creates a possibility, but not a
certainty, of rapid economic development.  Spagat (2001) also suggests that transition
economies might be separating into two groups: a successful one in which human capital
and living standards are rising and an unsuccessful group that is converging with the
developing world.
1
                                                          
1 There is some support for this idea in a recent EBRD report.  Based on a survey of foreign investors and
domestic enterprises it concludes that:  “...firms in transition economies lag behind advanced industrialized
countries in terms of the quality of their workforce.  Such quality gaps are larger in the CIS than in CEE.
This finding qualifies the view that the region has abundant human capital resources, despite considerable6
In this survey paper I will present various models from the large theoretical
literature on human capital and growth with the goal of extracting useful lessons for
transition economies.  Sections three and four emphasize liquidity constraints and are
based on models developed without reference to transition economies.  Nevertheless, I
believe the frameworks are quite illuminating for the transition context so I work through
their possible implications for this case.  Sections four and five focus on intergenerational
externalities and are based on models I developed specifically for transition economies.  I
conclude in section six.  Throughout the paper I consider possible policy interventions.
2.  LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
Consider a very simple model linking income distribution, liquidity constraints
and human capital investment along the lines of Banerjee and Newman (1991) and Galor
and Zeira (1993).  The basic idea here is that inequality is bad for long-run growth.
2
There is empirical evidence for this relationship (Perotti, 1996 and Benabou ,1996)
although it has been questioned (Deininger and Squire, 1998).
Time is counted off at discrete intervals,  ,... 2 , 1 , 0 = t .  There are two sectors, a
“skilled” sector and an “unskilled” sector.  In every period the skilled wage is w and the
unskilled wage is 1.
There is an overlapping generations structure with  N  dynasties of agents indexed
by i.  Each agent lives two periods.  Each family has one parent and one child alive at
any point in time.  As a matter of convention adults at time t are called generation t.
                                                                                                                                                                            
achievements in formal education.  Moreover, the lack of restructuring in the less reformed economies of
the region means that many skilled workers are performing jobs that do not reflect their levels of education.
Over time, there will be a continuing loss of skills, leading to an even greater gap in quality.”  (EBRD,
2000, p. iii of executive summary. Micklewright (1999) also provides some supporting evidence.7
Children either work and earn 1 or invest in human capital and pay  0 > d .  Adults
who did not invest in human capital earn an additional 1 while those who did invest in
human capital earn w.  I assume that  2 > - d w  so every agent wants to invest in human
capital if possible.
Every agent has the same utility function  ( ) ( ) ( ) b a c b c U ln ln , + = where  0 > a is a
constant, c is consumption and b  is a bequest that goes to the agent’s child.  Agent iat
time t maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint:
￿
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￿
+
+ -
= +
-
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t i
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where subscript it refers to individual i of generation t.  The solution is:
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with s and u  superscripts indicating skilled and unskilled agents respectively.
Individual i of generation t becomes skilled if and only if  d b t i ‡ -1 , .  Suppose
a
aw
d a
+
< <
1
2 .  Then the system converges to a situation where there are two types of
dynasties: skilled and unskilled.  Skilled individuals bequeath to their children  ( ) d w a - ,
which is sufficient to allow the latter to invest in human capital.  Unskilled individuals
bequeath  a 2  which is not sufficient to allow their offspring to invest.
                                                                                                                                                                            
2In the model inequality will be bad for output but I could reformulate the analysis in terms of growth rates.8
This very simple model turns out to provide a very rich basis for discussion.  First,
note that any dynasty that begins with a bequest below d  will remain unskilled forever.
Therefore long-run output and welfare depends on the initial distribution of income. The
relationship between inequality and output is complex.  In a poor economy skewness is
good for output because it leaves lots of agents with bequests aboved .  In a rich
economy equality is helpful for getting lots of people above d .
Second, education subsidies financed with a tax on the rich can be beneficial for
long-run output, although they will not necessarily be Pareto-improving.  If, for example,
adults are taxed with the proceeds transferred to children to overcome liquidity
constraints for education, then there will be no way to compensate these adults from
within the economic system.  A possible alternative is to tax children with bequests above
d  to bring other children with bequests below d  up to this threshold.  The richer
children could be fully compensated when they are adults.  A problem with this approach
is that it could distort the bequest motives of adults if they do not place full trust in
compensation that is promised one generation in the future.  Another interesting
possibility is to use international borrowing to overcome liquidity constraints.  In
principle, such a scheme can be organized through an international organization such as
the World Bank.  The idea would be that money in the present would be used to finance
educational investment with the money being repaid after the beneficiaries of the scheme
were enjoying the enhanced earning potential that it has unlocked.
There are further interesting financing possibilities if there is an externality
according to which the skill premium responds positively to the fraction of skilled
workers in the population.  For example, suppose the skilled wage in period t is9
N
kN
w
s
t + and the unskilled wage is 
N
kN
s
t + 1 where k  is a constant and 
s
t N  is the number
of skilled workers at time t.  Such as externality introduces a further motivation for
people above d to be willing to pay taxes to allow other people to invest in their own
human capital development.
Third, there are reasons for believing that early intervention will work much better
than late intervention because subsidies will have to be larger once families have been
unskilled for a long time than they would have to be before the class structure has fully
hardened. In the initial period there may be many individuals with bequests just below d .
If these individuals are denied access to educational investment then their descendents
will have bequests farther from d  than they themselves were.
3.  EDUCATIONAL EXTERNALITIES
I now take a closer look at the problem of financing human capital investment in
the presence of externalities.  I develop the model further based on Drazen (2000)’s
version of Perotti (1993).  I will drop time subscripts because I will focus on the situation
at a single point in time.  With this analysis in hand we could easily trace out full
dynamics if we wished to do so.
There are three groups, High, Middle and Low of sizes 
H N , 
M N  and
L N respectively where no group has more than half of the population.  The income of
each group is denoted 
H b , 
M b  and 
L b respectively where 
L H b d b > >  and 
M b  is near
the average income level 
N
b N b N b N
b
L L M M H H + +
”  in a sense to be explained later.10
Income is taxed at a flat rate t  and revenue is redistributed to everyone in equal
shares.  This means that after-tax-and-redistribution income for each type is given by
( ) b b I
i i t t + - ” 1  for  L M H i , , =  and type i invests in human capital if and only if
t
t
-
-
‡
1
b d
b
i .  This means that there is a critical tax rate 
i
i
i
b b
b d
-
-
=
~
t , which determines
whether or not high and low types invest.  For high types 
~i t is the maximum rate
consistent with human capital investment.  For low types 
~i t is the minimum rate
consistent with human capital investment.
The meaning of the assumption that 
M b  is “near” the average income level b  is
that the tax rate does not affect the investment decision of the middle group.  Specifically,
I require that 
M b  and b  are on the same side of d .  This is an assumption I will drop in
later models.
Without an externality the most preferred tax rate for each group is zero for any
group with income above the mean and one for any group with income above the mean.
Now consider the effect of the same type of externality as was introduced in the previous
section, namely, the skilled wage in period t is 
N
kN
w
s
t + and the unskilled wage is
N
kN
s
t + 1 where k  is a constant and 
s
t N  is the number of skilled workers at time t.  Now
most preferred tax rates will turn on whether or not b  is greater than or less than d , i.e.,
on whether the economy is rich or poor.  The basic idea is that in a rich economy high
taxes are good for growth because if they are high enough then even Low agents can
invest in human capital.  If the externality is sufficiently strong a majority of the11
population will vote for high taxes even if Middle agents have above-average income.
On the other hand, in a poor economy low taxes are good for growth because taxes must
to low if any agent, in particular High agents, is to invest in human capital.  If the
externality is strong enough low taxes can win even if the middle class has below average
income.
More formally, define a Rich Economy by the property that high-income and
middle-income agents will invest at any tax rate. Then at the tax rate 
L
L
L
b b
b d
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-
=
~
t  the
poor also invest.  High-income agents compare  0 = t with 
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if 
H
M H
L H L b
N
N N
k w b b k w +
+
+ > + ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
- + + t t
~
1  and the latter otherwise.  Low-
income agents prefer  1 = t .  If  b b
M <  then middle-income agents agree with the poor on
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Next consider the case of a poor economy defined by the property that the only
agents who can possibly invest are high-income agents and they will only do so if taxes
are sufficiently low.  Then the most preferred tax rate for high-income agents is  0 = t .
Low-income agents prefer  1 = t  if  b b
N
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middle-income agents compare prefer  1 = t  if  b b
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One can argue that some transition economies can be captured in this framework
as poor with high k .  The idea behind high k  is that there is major work to be done in
building the institutions of a market economy.  Since there are working models to learn
from plus western cooperation, it is possible to build these institutions, and increase
productivity, very quickly.  There are also great opportunities for technological catch-up
and even the possibility of leapfrogging over technologies that are entrenched in the
West.  But human capital is vital for this process and the more human capital that is
available the faster will be the catch-up, institutional and technological.  This suggest a
possible scenario in which middle income people, and possibly low-income people as
well, might cooperate by voting for low taxes to allow high-income people to invest in
their own human capital.  High k  means a large externality, which means that everyone
benefits strongly from this investment.
Returning to the dynamic view one can envision the scenario continuing in the
next generation with significantly higher taxes and widespread access to human capital
investment.  Thus, I arrive at a possible policy of elitism in the first generation and
widespread access in the second generation.  My opinion is that while I think this
approach is worth serious consideration I am not inclined to support it.  I believe the
above view neglects a crucial starting condition of the transition, namely, that although
transition economies tend to be poor they generally have achieved high educational13
standards.  I next turn to the question of how to take advantage of the positive legacy of
high educational standards and the danger it will be squandered.
4.  INTERGENERATIONAL EXTERNATILITIES
3
I now drop the financing constraint for human capital investment, i.e., set  0 = d .
I retain our basic wage equation structure.  In period t the skilled wage for adults is
N
N k
w
s
t
s
+  and the unskilled wage for adults is 
N
N k
s
t
u
+ 1 where k  is a constant and 
s N
is the number of skilled workers and  2 > w .  Young people are either working for a wage
of one or investing in human capital and earning zero.  The main difference from what I
had before is that now I allow the strength of the human capital externality to vary across
sectors.
I impose the following assumptions:  2 > w  and 
s u k wk 2 < .  These assumptions
ensure that skilled wages are always higher than unskilled wages and that the skill
premium, i.e., the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, is increasing in the number of
educated people.  This idea of complementarity between skilled workers seems
particularly plausible in the transition economy case in which institution building and
technological development are primarily the responsibility of skilled individuals.
I now emphasize what might be called “intergenerational intellectual continuity”.
This is based on the well-documented fact, true in every society for which I have seen
information, that children of well-educated parents have a better chance of being well
                                                          
3 This section is based closely on Spagat (2002).14
educated themselves than children of poorly educated parents.  I will take a particularly
simple formulation that captures this idea:
( )
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
=
-
otherwise
education   chooses     if 1 ,
h
i h
h
t i
it
a
where  1 0 < <a .  The notion is that the better is the education of the parents the easier it
will be for children to invest in human capital.  There can be a variety of reasons for this
that are difficult to disentangle empirically from each other.  Parents with a lot of
education generally have more money to invest in their children than those who do not,
although this may often not be the case in transition economies.  Also parents with a lot
of education tend to value education more than parents who have not and also the former
group knows better how to transfer education to children than the latter group.  Those
who do not make a special investment just get the basic level of education that is
prevalent in the society.
The income of individual i of generation t is:
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Individual i of generation t will chose education, i.e., to invest in human capital, if and
only if15
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that is, a child’s human capital investment decision will depend on whether or not
parental human is above a “cut-off” level that depends on the relative wages of skilled
and unskilled workers and the parameter a .  Note that the cut-off level of parental human
capital, 
c
t h , is decreasing in the fraction of skilled workers.  Suppose that
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 for all t.  This assumption can be cast in terms of parameters rather
than the endogenous variables by assuming  1
2 2
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.  The content of
this assumption is that children of parents with basic education will always choose basic
education because even with the maximum possible skill premium their family
background is too weak to make it worthwhile to invest.  At the same time, children of
parents with one unit of human capital will always choose to invest in human capital
because their family background is so good that they will invest even with the worst
possible skill premium.
It is easy to show that this system will converge to a point where each dynasty
will have either basic education, h, or one unit of human capital.  I assume that  1 0 , £ i h so
that skilled dynasties converge from below to the human capital level of one.  Any young16
individual at time  1 - t  whose parents have human capital less than 
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will
choose basic education and all his descendents will remain trapped in basic education.
This irreversibility of the failure of one member of a dynasty to invest in human capital is
a consequence of that strong assumption, 
a
1
2
￿ ￿
ł
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+
< s
u
k w
k
h , but I can relax this
assumption.  The corresponding result will then be that once one member of a dynasty
fails to invest in human capital then his descendents will have to pay a heavy price to
reverse their fortunes.  In the current set-up period 1 is the only one in which a dynasty
can jump down to h because wages cannot go down and any individual who invests in
human capital will have at least as much as his parent.  But in the crucial period 1 there is
a definite possibility of loss of human capital.
An important property of this model is that there can be multiple equilibria, some
with low investment rates and some with high investment rates.  Consider the following
illustrative example.  At time zero there are three groups labeled “High”, “Medium” and
“Low”.  Each individual in the high group has parental human capital of 1, while those in
the Medium and Low groups have parental human capital of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively.
The groups are sizes 20, 60 and 20 respectively.  The table summarizes the situation.
HC Distribution for a Typical Transition Economy
High Medium Low
Number 20 60 20
Human Capital 1 2/3 1/317
This distribution is meant to reflect the idea that in a typical transition economy there are
a large number of people who have attained a good educational standard.  I contrast the
transition economy human capital distribution with that of a non-transition economy at a
similar standard of living.  The latter stochastically dominates the former.  Note that the
example works even if the Medium group is merged with the Low group.
HC Distribution for a comparable non-Transition Economy
High Medium Low
Number 20 30 50
Human Capital 1 2/3 1/3
Fix the parameter values as in the following table.
Parameter Values for the Transition and non-Transition Economies
a w s k
u k
.5 2.3 1.5 1
The transition economy has two equilibria, a good one and a bad one.  In one
equilibrium only the High group invests in human capital.  In the other equilibrium both
the High group and the Medium group invest.  There is no equilibrium in which the low
group invests.
4  On the other hand, there is only one equilibrium in the non-transition
                                                          
4When only the High group invests I have  72 .
6 . 2
2 . 2
2
= ￿
ł
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c h  so only the High group will want to
invest.  When both high and medium groups invest then  64 .
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= ￿
ł
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c h  both of these groups but not
the low group will want to invest.  If all three groups invest then  62 .
8 . 3
3
2
= ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ =
c h  so investment by
the low group will not be sustainable.18
economy.  In this equilibrium only the High group invests.
5  It is clear that this example
has a fair degree of robustness.  Thus, I can conclude that there is much at stake in the
transition economy case.  If expectations can be coordinated on a positive vision of the
future then many people will invest in human capital and the economy will take off on an
excellent trajectory.  Pessimism about the future can be lethal.
An easy extension of the model makes another potentially important policy point.
A temporary inability of an educational system to support large-scale human capital
investment can have a large negative effect on the growth rate of the economy.  Suppose
the educational system cannot allow human capital investment beyond the basic level for
more than 50% of the population.  Then the transition economy becomes effectively
equivalent to the non-transition economy and there will be a large loss of human capital.
This point is important because one often encounters the view that returns to education
are generally high in transition economies and therefore there is no problem with human
capital accumulation.  But people must have both the incentive and the opportunity to
accumulate human capital if they are to do so.
Financing constraints could also be brought back into our analysis at this point.
Remember that in the previous models every agent had an incentive to acquire human
capital but only those who also had sufficient financial resources actually did so.  Rather
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by the low group will not be sustainable.19
than return to financing constraints I turn to a more careful look at the problem of
reforming the educational system and how that can fit in with long-range strategy for
transition economies.
5.  Educational Reform
This section is based on Fan, Overland and Spagat (1999).  The human capital
accumulation equation is
( )
a a -
- - + =
1
1 , 1 it t i t it e h E h
where  1 + t E  is the quality of the educational system at time  1 + t  and  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ it e  is the effort
that individual i of generation t expends on human capital accumulation.
For simplicity I set the unskilled wage equal to one in every period and drop any
externality effects on this wage.  The skilled wage will satisfy  t t A w =  where
( ) 1
*
1
1 ,
1 -
=
-
- - ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
+ = ￿ t
N
i
t i
t t A A
N
h
k A A
and  0
* A A >  are fixed and  () ￿ k  is an increasing function.  This formulation is similar to
what I have used before but it uses the average human capital level rather than the
number of well-educated people and it explicitly uses a catching-up framework.  It also
moves the externality effect over one time period; generation t creates the institutions
and technology that generation  1 + t  uses and on which the wages of generation  1 + t  are
based.  This switch allows us to avoid multiple equilibrium problems.20
The income of individual i of generation t is given by
( )( )
￿
￿
￿
+
> + + -
=
otherwise 2
0   if 1 1
r
e h w r e
I
it it t it
it
where  0 > r  is an interest rate.  It is there because I will be considering a costly
investment decision in improving the educational system and I need an interest rate for a
sensible analysis.  Once I have an interest rate, consistency demands that it applies to the
income of individuals.
It is not hard to show that, as in our previous model, at each time t there is a cut-
off level of parental human capital such that individuals above this level will invest at
least some effort in acquiring human capital while those below will work both periods of
their lives in the unskilled sector while allocating no effort to acquiring human capital.
The cut-off level of human capital is
( ) 1 , - = t t
c
t E w h h
where  ( ) ￿ ￿, h  is decreasing in both arguments.  A higher wage and/or better educational
system will induce individuals from weaker family backgrounds to invest in human
capital than would otherwise be the case.
Educational restructuring is a one-shot process that can be done at any time t or
deferred indefinitely.  Restructuring raises educational quality immediately and21
permanently from  E to  E  where  E E < < 0 .  If education is restructured in period s,
s t for E E s t E E t t ‡ = < =    and for .
6
Let 
s
it I  denote the pre-tax income of individual i of generation t when the
education system is restructured in period s.  The baseline case under which
restructuring never takes place is  ¥ = s .  Define  ￿
=
¥ - ” Y
N
i
it
s
it
s
t I I
1
.  
s
t Y is generation t's
total surplus pre-tax income due to restructuring in period s compared to never
restructuring.
The first fact to note is that restructuring generates more pre-tax income for every
generation after the restructuring occurs.  The reason for this is as follows.  Restructuring
encourages more human capital investment than would otherwise be the case, which
leads to higher incomes for those who take advantage of the better education system.
This increases average human capital so wages grow faster than they would have without
restructuring.  The next generation has better educated parents and anticipates higher
wages per unit of human capital than would have been the case without restructuring.
The process continues.
I cannot conclude from this fact that immediate educational restructuring is a
good investment because I have not yet considered the costs of this policy.  Educational
restructuring requires borrowing a fixed sum, C .  If education is restructured at time s,
                                                          
6 World Bank (1995) and OECD (1998) both criticize the Russian education system for producing the
wrong mix of specialties, i.e., primarily scientists and engineers to serve the Soviet military-industrial
complex, for overemphasis on specialization and for overreliance on rote learning.  One need not accept all
of these points in order to agree with our general point that the education system is not suited to the needs
of a modern market economy and that reform can unlock much underlying potential.  Other transition
economies are in a similar situation.22
repayment begins with the adults of generation  1 + s , i.e., the first generation that is able
to take advantage of the improved educational opportunities.
I will consider two possible financing schemes for educational restructuring.
Under normal financing debt is serviced in perpetuity so that each generation after  1 + s
owes rC .   Under flexible financing at time  0 = s  generation 1 pays 
0
1 Y  and generation
2 pays ( )( ) rC r rC + + Y - 1
0
1 .  This scheme takes advantage of the fact that generation 2
might receive enough surplus from restructuring at time 0 that it would be able to pay not
only its own loan service obligations but also the portion of generation 1's obligations
with interest that the latter cannot handle out of surplus.  I will assume normal financing
except for the last proposition of this paper.
Define  { } rC s s
s
s ‡ Y = +1
* : min .  Under normal financing, any generation before
1 * + s  would vote unanimously against educational restructuring while generation  1 * + s
would vote in its favor.  Therefore, any reasonable political economy theory would imply
that, under normal financing, educational restructuring would occur precisely at time 
* s .
The next important fact is that there are only three possible paths for the human
capital of a dynasty.  They are;
1.  Human capital increases monotonically from time 0.  The relative wage of skilled
labor and the efficiency of the education system are increasing monotonically in
time.  Therefore, if it is optimal for a child to surpass his parent, it must be
optimal for the grandchild, facing an even better human- capital-acquisition
environment, to surpass the child.:
2.  Human capital decreases monotonically from time 0.  Suppose the quality of the
education system is poor and wages are low so that a child is not willing to23
reproduce his parent’s human capital level.  If productivity increases slowly, then
a dynasty may continue to run down its human capital stock.:
3.  Human capital follows a U-shaped curve.  This case begins like the second but,
either due to a late educational restructuring or a substantial increase in the skilled
wage, a child's human capital level might eventually be able to cross over that of
his parent's.  Once this occurs, the dynamics of the first case take over and human
capital for that dynasty never again decreases.:
One could say that, implicitly or explicitly scenario 3, with its temporary neglect of
education, is the policy of many transition economy governments.
Another important fact is that I can define  0 > > h h with the property that if
education is reformed the human capital of every dynasty will converge to either hor 0
and if education is not reformed he human capital of every dynasty will converge to
either h or 0.
Proposition 1.  (Comparative steady states)  Suppose that  ( ) 0 ,
* > E A h
c .  (a) If at
any time t the human capital of a dynasty falls below  ( ) 0 , > t t
c E w h , the human capital
of that dynasty vanishes forever.  (b) The number of dynasties whose human capital level
converges to 0 is decreasing in s.
7
This proposition already contains the idea that delaying educational restructuring
can be costly for the long-run future of the economy.  The bad scenario is that
restructuring is delayed for one generation, many individuals who have sufficient parental
human capital to make it worthwhile to invest in human capital with a restructured24
educational system do not have enough parental human capital to do so with an
unrestructured one.  These individuals drop down to basic education and their
descendents will not invest even with a restructured educational system.
Let  1 F  denote the number of individuals of generation one who will choose to
invest zero units of time in acquiring human capital at time zero if the education system is
not restructured at time zero.  I have the following result.
Proposition 2.  (Restructuring: now or much later)  Suppose there exists i such that
E E hi - ‡ 0 .  Then if  1 F  is sufficiently close to N , it is the case that  1 0
* * „ ￿ „ s s .
The first condition in the proposition means that the difference for some child of having a
highly educated parent versus having a very poorly educated parent is at least as
important to his development as is the difference between having a reformed education
system versus having an unreformed system.  The condition on  1 F  is far from necessary
for the result.  The intuition of proposition 2 is as follows.  If restructuring is not
implemented in period zero, the present generation of young people will invest lightly in
education.  This will diminish their ability to facilitate their children’s human capital
development and retard the rate of the economy's productivity growth, further eroding
their children’s incentive to invest in education.  Hence, an educational restructuring
initiative in period one does not yield enough surplus to allow these children to pay for its
cost.  Therefore, if restructuring is not implemented in period zero, it is delayed for at
least another generation.
The next two propositions indicate that 
* s  has some nice properties.
                                                                                                                                                                            
7 All the propositions are proven in Fan, Overland and Spagat (1999).25
Proposition 3.  (
* s  is an optimal restructuring time)  If  i e h e i " £ £ , 0  and  ( ) 0 , 0 < E w h
c ,
* s  is Pareto Optimal and Pareto dominates any 
* > s s .
The conditions imply that the human capital of each dynasty will be nonincreasing in
time without restructuring and nondecreasing in time with restructuring, i.e., I eliminate
the U-shape scenario.
Proposition 4.  (Restructuring is egalitarian)  Suppose that the conditions of Proposition
3 hold.  Then the economy under 
* s  has a lower Gini coefficient for every time after 
* s
than the economy would have for any 
* > s s .
So educational restructuring at time 
* s  is efficient and egalitarian.  But I must be
careful not to jump too quickly to the conclusion that this is the best policy.  Recall that
Proposition 2 suggests that it is quite possible that  2
* = s .  However, time 2 does not
Pareto dominate time 0.  In fact, by I know that all generations after and including
generation 3 prefer time 0 to time 2.  Moreover, it is quite possible that generation 2
prefers time 0 and that generation 1 is close to being on a margin of indifference.  In this
plausible case, delaying restructuring would give a small advantage to generation 1 while
punishing all future generations, perhaps severely.  Therefore, while 
* s  is a Pareto
Optimal choice, it might be undesirable from a broader welfare point of view.  Second,
the next proposition shows that expanding the range of financing mechanisms can
actually make time 0 Pareto superior to time 2.26
Proposition 7.  (Flexible financing argues for early restructuring)  Suppose  2
* = s .
Restructuring at time 0 using the flexible financing scheme creates a Pareto improvement
over restructuring at time 2 under the standard financing scheme if and only if
( ) ( )
0
2
0
1 1 1 Y + + Y £ + + r rC r rC .
Moving too fast toward full cost recovery of an educational reform  can be
counterproductive.  Generation 1 might reject a proposal to restructure education if its
members would have to pay their full share of the cost, rC .  However, if a loan is offered
on sufficiently soft terms to this generation, they will accept the arrangement and many
members will alter their behavior by investing more of their own time in human capital
acquisition.  Generation 2, now endowed with higher quality parents as a result of the
early reform, will happily make up for the initial softness of the loan.
6. Conclusion
What makes transition economies special?  Of course, one could point to lots of
things.  But a crucial one, if not the crucial one is that they have, or at least they had, high
human capital relative to their living standards.  The New Growth Theory emphasizes
human capital quite a bit and there is significant empirical support for the intuitively very
plausible idea that human capital is very important for growth.  So transition economies
could have great prospects as argued, for example, in Barry (2002).
8  Unfortunately, I do
not think things are quite that simple.  I do believe there is the potential for very rapid
growth in transition economies so that living standards rise to meet human capital levels.
But I also believe there is potential for substantial human capital decline so that human
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capital levels fall to meet living standards.  In fact, I believe that both phenomena are
happening right now although they can be reversed.
Educational standards and traditions are built up slowly over long period of time.
Although educational standards take a long time to develop, they can be lost relatively
quickly.  I think that the best way to illustrate this is to focus on families.  Families are a
major transmission belt for education.  Well-educated parents tend to produce well-
educated children.  A society with a lot of well-educated parents is in an excellent
position to pass this education down to it younger generation.  However, if something
comes along and disrupts this intergenerational transfer then a society can be set back for
decades.
Such disruption can result, for example, from a major economics crisis that decreases the
economic returns to acquiring education, a big structural shift in the economy that makes
parts of the education system obsolete, deterioration in the quality of the education
system, e.g., due to funding cuts or an increase in the cost of acquiring education that
restricts access to the education system.
9  The key point is that that these disruptions are
bad not just for the current generation of young people, but also that damage done to the
current generation of young people is likely to reverberate for several generations as
poorly educated young people turn into poorly prepared parents.  Thus, several
generations of work can be squandered very quickly.
Is human capital deterioration a serious phenomenon in transition economies?  I
think it is in some and it isn’t in others.  Generally speaking the countries that have been
doing well, and are first in line to join the EU, seem to be doing a good job of preserving
                                                          
9 I can think of other mechanisms.  For example, it takes a long time and a lot of effort to create a large
number of good teachers.  Yet they might disperse rather quickly if they are poorly treated for too long.28
and even enhancing their human capital.  To get a sense of the situation, consider pre-
school enrollment.  This is an important indicator because it is well established that good
pre-schools have positive long-lasting effects for children yet pre-school is not
mandatory.  Between 1989 and 1999 pre-school enrollment has held steady in Central
Europe but has plummeted in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Other indicators, like
public spending on education and secondary school enrollments tell a similar story.  A
bright spot is enrollment in higher education although the quality of such education is
doubtful.
10
It is important to realize also that looking at the national level can be quite
misleading.  There are, for example, big urban-rural differences.  In many countries
educational standards in the capital city are far above those elsewhere in the country.  The
point is that it is likely that throughout the post-communist world there are pockets of
poverty forming that could prove to be quite intractable.   Human capital deterioration
seems very real for some transition countries and even many regions within otherwise
successful countries.
Should transition economies make a priority of investing in education?  To many
people the answer has been “obviously no”.  Their reasoning is human capital is a bright
spot in the transition economy landscape.  Invoking the standard concept of diminishing
marginal returns one would want to invest a lot in backward areas where marginal
products are high rather than successful areas where they are low.  I would challenge this
common response.  In my view relatively modest investments now might prevent very
large future costs
                                                          
10 This data can be found on http://www.unicef-icdc.org/documentation/index.html.29
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